Tài liệu Coping with Iran - Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement - A Conference Report pptx

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PREFACE
On March 21, 2007, the RAND Corporation held a public conference
on Capitol Hill titled, “Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment,
or Engagement?” The director of the RAND International Security and
Defense Policy Center, Ambassador James Dobbins, hosted the event. The
conference featured high-level experts and was attended by more than
300 guests, including former ambassadors, members of Congress and
senior staffers, senior journalists, Pentagon officials, and numerous
well-known Middle East analysts. Two high-level officials, Ambassador
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and
Ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian Ambassador to the United
Nations (via videoconference), also shared their national perspectives
with the audience in one-hour sessions each. The conference sought to
facilitate an informed discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of
various policy options for addressing the Iranian challenge.
This report provides a summary account of remarks presented during
the conference; this report is not a direct transcript of the
conference. The views expressed in this document are those of the
participants, as interpreted by the RAND Corporation.
This conference was hosted by the International Security and
Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division
(NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands,
the defense agencies, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the
U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign
governments, and foundations.
For more information on RAND's International Security and Defense
Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached
by email at James_Dobbins@rand.org; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension
5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street,
Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is
available at www.rand.org.

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CONTENTS
Preface iii
Figures ix
Conference Summary xi
Acknowledgments xv
Abbreviations xvii
Introduction 1
Panel 1: Inside Iran 3
Panel Members 3
Role of the Regime 3
How the United States May Misperceive Iranian Politics: Six
Observations 4
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Nuclear “Carpet,” and Iraq 5
Final Thoughts: The Iranian Populace and Two Ticking Clocks 6
The Regime: Disagreement and Discord but Also Consensus? 7
Question and Answer Session 8
1. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s Trip to Turkey 8
2. President Ahmadi-Nejad as a Political Liability 9
3. Statement by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 10
4. Russia’s Decision to Suspend Cooperation at Bushehr 11
5. U.S. Congress and Iranian Parliamentarians 11
6. Effect of Civil Action on U.S. Foreign Policy 11
7. 2003 Proposal for a Grand Bargain 12
8. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 12
Panel 2: Looking At Two Alternative Futures 13
Panel Members 13
Iran, the United States, and Nuclear Weapons: An Examination
of Key Policy Issues 13
Iran’s Motivations for Acquiring Nuclear Weapons 14
Iran’s Conventional Forces 14
Iran’s “Strategic Loneliness” 16
A Nuclear-Armed Iran? 17
An Attack on Iran 23
Policy Directions 26
Five Key Points 30
Powerful Drivers, Risks, and Possible Outcomes 32
Question and Answer Session 34
1. Effectiveness of Security Guarantees 34
2. Lessons from History and Unintended Consequences 35
3. Consortium Proposal 36
4. Israel and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons 36
Closing Statement 37
An Iranian Perspective 39
Presenter and Responders 39
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Iran’s National Security Environment 39
Regional Stability and Security 40
Weapons of Mass Destruction 41
Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis 41
Question and Answer Session 42
1. UNSC Resolution 42
2. A Two-Month Suspension of Enrichment——but What Next? 43
3. Legitimacy of the UNSC Resolution 43
4. “Suspension for Suspension” 43
5. Iran’s Role in Iraq 44
6. March 2006 Offer by the Supreme Leader 44
7. Regional Involvement in Iraq 44
8. Iranian Reaction to Russian Suspension of Bushehr 45
9. Location of General Ali Reza Askari 45
10. Israel and Iranians in Custody in Iraq 45
11. The Population’s Rights in Iran 46
12. Goal of the Regional Ministerial Meeting 46
13. Hizballah and Hamas 46
14. Helping Iraq Despite a Continued U.S. Presence 47
15. Iran’s View of a Consortium 47
Panel 3: What to Do: Preemption? Containment? Engagement? 49
Panel Members 49
Iraq or Iran: Which Comes First? 49
Elements of a Successful Diplomatic Strategy 50
Addressing Uncertainties 52
Where to Now? 53
Question and Answer Session 55
1. Iraq Study Group Report 55
2. An Acceptable Outcome for Israel 55
3. United States——Aggressive Talk, but Carrying a Small
Stick? 56
4. Iran’s Role in Iraq 56
5. Should Congress Authorize the Use of Force? 57
6. Lessons from Relations with China in the 1970s 57
7. The IRGC and the Risk of Escalation 58
8. The Role of Dissidents in Iran 58
A U.S. Perspective 59
Presenter and Responders 59
How the U.S. Government Views Iran 59
Question and Answer Session 62
1. The Key to Successful Negotiations 62
2. Moving Diplomacy Forward——Addressing Iran’s Concerns 62
3. Eurodiff Consortium 62
4. Change in Perception 63
5. The Israeli Assessment 63
6. Bilateral Talks Between the United States and Iran About
Iraq 63
7. Restricting Travel of Ambassador Zarif 63
8. Promoting Democracy 64
9. Export Credits 64
10. Agreeing on an Acceptable End Point 64
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11. U.S. Diplomats in Iran and Controlling Arms Exports 65
Conclusion 67
Appendix A. Conference Program 69
Appendix B. Participant Biographies 71
R. Nicholas Burns 71
Patrick Clawson 72
James Dobbins 72
Michael Eisenstadt 73
Anne Gearan 74
Michael Hirsh 74
Robert E. Hunter 75
David Ignatius 76
Martin Indyk 77
Daniel Levy 78
David Ochmanek 79
Paul Pillar 79
Danielle Pletka 80
Kenneth M. Pollack 80
Karim Sadjadpour 81
Steven Simon 82
Ray Takeyh 83
Mohammad Javad Zarif 84
Selected Bibliography 87

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FIGURES
Figure 1 - Area of 5-psi Overpressure, 20-Kiloton Airburst 20
Figure 2 - Shaping the Future U.S Iran Security Relationship (1) 27
Figure 3 - Shaping the Future U.S Iran Security Relationship (2) 28

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CONFERENCE SUMMARY
Discussions throughout the one-day conference “Coping with Iran:
Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement?” broached a number of key
issues, including internal leadership and societal dynamics within
Iran, Iran’s relationship with other regional actors, the implications
of a nuclear-armed Iran or a military strike against Iran, and the
various policy options available to address key issues such as Iran’s
nuclear capabilities, instability in Iraq, and terrorism. Many
participants argued at the conference that some degree of both
containment and engagement was the best policy approach toward Iran and
that a use-of-force option was neither imminent nor desirable. There
was a general sense that UN sanctions and economic pressure was working
in isolating Iran (even if some desired that it work faster).
Furthermore, Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns emphasized that the United
States is willing to be patient to allow economic and diplomatic
efforts to work and stated that there are no imminent deadlines that
would cause the U.S. government to pursue a drastic course in its
approach toward Iran.
To follow are several other key themes that emerged from the
discussions:
x U.S Iranian cooperation is possible, especially on Iraq.
Despite a legacy of nearly 30 years of antipathy and
mistrust, previous crises——such as the aftermath of the
Afghanistan war——have demonstrated that U.S Iranian
cooperation is possible when key issues of mutual concern
are at stake. Several panelists believed that was the
situation today with respect to Iraq and that, without
Iranian cooperation, the stabilization of Iraq would prove
difficult if not impossible. Some panelists believed that
the beginnings of U.S Iranian cooperation on Iraq
(currently within a multilateral framework) could
potentially lead to broader, bilateral negotiations in the
future, including on the nuclear question. Still, the level
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of mistrust is so high that few expected dramatic
breakthroughs in the next 20 months.
x Iran may be interested in working with the United States and
the international community to find a solution to the
nuclear issue. Ambassador Mohammad Javad Zarif emphasized
Iranian ambitions to strengthen nonproliferation efforts.
Panelists noted that successful negotiations would require
establishing an end point agreeable to all parties.
Ambassador Zarif suggested renewed efforts for an
international consortium, which would provide more
transparency of Iran’s nuclear program as well as increased
international monitoring. He also noted that the paradigm
of “mistrust and verify” would govern the nature of a
solution on Iran’s nuclear file. Ambassador Burns stated
that, while Iran did not have the right to become a nuclear-
armed country, the United States would allow Iran “exit
doors” in negotiations.
x The UN sanction process and international economic pressure
are working. Over the past several months, U.S. leverage has
increased as Iran is further isolated by what one panelist
called the “coalition of the reluctant.” Many panelists
believed that “hanging tough” through diplomatic and
economic measures——including strengthening restrictions on
European trade with Iran——is producing results, changing
Iranian calculations and ultimately behavior, at least in
the short term. In the long term, few doubted that Iran——
under any type of government——would continue to seek a
nuclear weapon capability.
x Preemption is not imminent. Even among a group of
participants with views from across the political spectrum,
no panelist argued that the use-of-force option was imminent
or desirable. Many recognized the significant risks and